Federal and state felony collateral sanctions directly impact the opportunities and resources available to ex-felons and in turn their ability to successfully reenter society after conviction and possible incarceration. Because felony collateral sanctions vary greatly from state to state, we offer a statelevel analysis of factors that produce differences in collateral sanctions levels adopted by U.S. states. Religion, political climate, and minority threat explanations have been linked to criminal penalty severity; however, no one to date has applied these explanations to felony collateral sanctions besides felony disenfranchisement at the macro level. With zero-truncated Poisson (ZTP) procedures, this study examines whether religion, political climate, and minority threat explanations result in states' adopting greater collateral sanctions against convicted felons. Our research reveals that conservative climate, religiosity, and racial threat, but not ethnic threat or punitiveness, significantly affect state-level collateral sanctions. States with large minority and conservative populations are more likely to have more stigmatizing collateral sanction that can affect recidivism. We find that race rather than ethnicity is an important predictor of the collateral sanctions levels that states adopt; however, public ideology in the form of conservatism and religiosity has a greater effect on collateral sanctions. Policy implications are discussed.
Introduction
Can the political climate and racial and ethnic makeup of a state determine whether a convicted felon receives collateral sanctions? So much of the existing research focuses on the barriers experienced by felons upon reentering the community, such as difficulties finding work and/or housing, reconnecting with family members, feeling a part of the community, and obtaining basic necessities such as food and shelter. Although obstacles often occur as a direct result of incarceration, felony disenfranchisement, and other ''collateral sanctions'' enacted through legislation also negatively affect ex-felons (Petersilia, 2003; Travis, 2002) . That is, specific federal-and state-level legislation limit the employment and civic participation of ex-felons. Additionally, laws can restrict a convicted felon's access to welfare and educational assistance. While some sanctions occur at the federal level, voter disenfranchisement and most employment and access to public assistance restrictions occur at the state level (Federal Interagency Reentry Council, 2011) . It is these macro-level processes, such as state-level variation in the adoption of collateral sanctions, that are the focus of our current research.
For example, despite evidence that legal employment greatly contributes to ex-felons' successful reentry (Pager, 2007; Wheelock, 2005) , especially among those over 27 years of age (Uggen, 2000) , state and federal laws frequently prevent ex-felons from obtaining legal employment in some occupational fields (Federal Interagency Reentry Council, 2011) . Additionally, access to welfare in the form of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is determined on a state-by-state basis despite federal laws that ban felons with drug or sex offenses from receiving assistance (Federal Interagency Reentry Council, 2011) .
While studies examine the consequences of felony convictions on individuals, such as finding employment (Nelson, Deess, & Allen, 1999; Sampson & Laub, 1993; Tripodi, Kim, & Bender, 2010; Uggen, 2000; Visher & Kachnowski, 2009) , redeveloping family ties and community reintegration (Sampson & Laub, 1993; Travis, Solomon, & Waul, 2001; Uggen, Manza, & Behrens, 2004; Uggen, Wakefield, and Western, 2005) , research that examines the adoption of collateral sanctions beyond felon disenfranchisement at the state level does not exist . Furthermore, even though political, economic, and racial characteristics have been tied to the greater application of severe sanctions (e.g., death penalty), and other aspects of social control (e.g., arrest rates), no study has explored whether these structural forces also influence a state's adoption of legal barriers. Our research attempts to explore how the types and number of collateral sanctions vary from state to state (see Appendix A for a list) and determine if the political and religious ideologies of the state, in addition to racial tensions, influence the rate that legal barriers are applied to convicted felons. There are sound theoretical reasons to pursue this empirical question, and we hope to fill a gap in an important and timely area of research.
Public Ideologies: Political and Religious
Punishment for crimes is a highly political issue (Chambliss, 1994 (Chambliss, , 1999 Garland 1990 Garland , 2005 Mauer, 2001; Yates & Fording, 2005) . What is considered a crime and how it is punished is determined by state-and federal-level government decisions. Numerous politicians have run on a ''tough on crime'' and penal reform platforms during election cycles, asking citizens to ''indulge rhetorically in a politics of moralism'' (Gottschalk 2006) .
Conservatism is generally associated with greater support for punitiveness due to the belief that crime is an individual and immoral choice and that criminals should be punished in a manner that is equally harmful to the criminal (Burnham, 1970; Garland, 1990; Thorne, 1990) . Additionally, conservatives are more likely to view punishment as a general deterrent (Molnar, 1976) and support the death penalty (Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003) . Liberals, on the other hand, are more likely to view crime as a result of poor environmental and social conditions that warrant rehabilitation (Garland, 2001; Taylor, Walton, & Young, 1973; Thorne, 1990) .
In the United States, the strength of the Republican party, which is identified as the ''law and order'' and conservative party, is related to increased prison admission rates (Jacobs & Helms, 1996) . Additionally, law and order campaigns have been prevalent among Republican candidates to garner support from poor constituents who are more likely to be victims of crime (Beckett, 1997) , and in turn, conservative states punish more severely (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Jacobs, Qian, Carmichael, & Kent, 2007) . Democrats, however, spend less on law enforcement and penal programs (Caldeira and Cowart, 1980) . According to research by Hibbs (1987) , Republican officials are more likely to select penal policies that benefit the wealthy at the expense of poorer constituents-constituents who are more likely to become involved in the criminal justice system (see also Blank and Blinder, 1986) . Republican support at the county level is positively related to enhanced use of asset forfeiture (Helms & Costanza, 2009) , and Helms and Costanza (2010) report ''African Americans who were tried and sentenced in Republican-leaning jurisdictions faced, on average, more severe penalties than other offenders'' (p. 484); however, they note that such disparate racial sentencing is conditioned by political context and racial factors and therefore not uniformly disparate.
In states where conservatism and the public attitudes toward crime and justice are punitive, we posit a higher level of collateral sanctions. Specifically, we hypothesize that a higher percentage of conservative voters and punitiveness at the state level will be directly associated with greater collateral sanctions. U.S. Presidential election poll results can be a useful way to gauge conservatism. For example, the percentage of the state's voters that participated in the election who voted for a Republican presidential candidate can indicate the level of conservatism in each state; however, this may not accurately capture punitive attitudes among the public. State-level punitiveness may be better measured through public opinion surveys that specifically ask about criminal justice issues such as the death penalty, gun control, and other tough on crime topics. Although some argue that public opinion has little direct impact on criminal justice policy (Beckett, 1997; Brown, 2006; Matthews, 2005) and that politicians overestimate the punitiveness of their constituents (Gottschalk 2008) , others have found evidence that public opinion has affected criminal justice policy and outcomes such as incarceration rates (Enns, 2010 (Enns, , 2013 Religion has also historically influenced the growth of punishments for criminal acts (Erikson, 1966; Iganatieff, 1978; McGowen, 1995) . Protestantism-the most common religion in the United States-particularly fundamentalist Protestantism is positively associated with support for more severe punishments and retribution for crime (Curry, 1996; Grasmick, Davenport, Chamlin, & Bursik, 1992; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004) . Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) , for instance, ''find that states where membership in fundamentalist churches is greatest are likely to imprison larger percentages of their population' ' (p. 81) .
For the purposes of this study, religion was gauged by using the Pew Research Center's U.S. Religious Landscape Survey. This survey has been commonly used to measure religiosity (Pesta, McDaniel, & Bertsch, 2010; Strayhorn & Strayhorn, 2009; and Reeve & Basalik, 2011) . Theoretically, states with greater religiosity should have greater collateral sanctions or legal barriers applied to convicted felons.
Minority Threat Hypothesis: Race, Ethnicity, and Crime Minority threat theorists posit that the dominant groups in society are threatened by large minority populations and react politically (Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967; Giles & Hertz, 1994) . Additionally, dominant groups have greater negative attitudes about minority groups and fear crime more when minority populations are large (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Fossett & Kiecolt, 1989; Golden, 2012; Liska, Lawrence, & Sanchirico, 1982; Quillian, 1996; Quillian & Pager, 2001; Quillian & Pager, 2010; and Taylor, 1998) . In response to perceived threat from minority populations, members of the dominant group ''support the coercive control of minorities'' (Ruddell, 2005, p. 11) .
As a result, law enforcement efforts are greater in areas with larger minority concentration. For instance, a sizable Black population results in more law enforcement agents in the field (Jacobs, 2014; Jackson, 1989; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Liska, Lawrence, & Benson, 1981; Ruddell & Thomas, 2010) , use of force by police officers (Holmes, 2000; Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998; Lersch, Bazley, Mieczowski, & Childs, 2008) , and higher arrest rates (Davenport, Soule, & Armstrong, 2011; Liska, Chamblin, & Reed, 1984) .
A growing Black population is also positively associated with greater punishments (e.g., capital punishment, incarceration, and collateral sanctions in the form of voter disenfranchisement) for criminal behavior. Prejudice against Blacks is related to increased support for capital punishment (Barkan and Cohn, 1994) , and this support grows within areas with larger Black populations (Baumer et al., 2003) . Jacobs and Carmichael found that percentage Black, as well as conservatism, is positively related to the legalization of capital punishment (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002) as well as use of the death penalty at the state level (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004) . Using cross-national data, Kent (2010) found that nations with large ethnic minority populations are the least likely to abolish the death penalty.
Other studies have found states with higher percentages of Black residents have higher incarceration rates (Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Western, 2006) , and ''political emphasis on black street crime led to a stronger relationship between African American presence and the incarceration rates'' (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001, p. 80) . Additionally, states with larger minority populations allocate more resources toward incarceration efforts (Beckett and Western, 2001; Jacobs & Helms, 1999) . Manza and Uggen (2006) found a significant relationship between the percentage of state-level populations and voting rights. African Americans were only granted the right to vote in states where they made up a small proportion of the population. Also, as barriers restricting Black men from voting (e.g., land owning requirements) were removed, states enacted felony disenfranchisement rates, particularly in states with larger Black populations . Many of these studies have claimed these findings provide support for the racial threat hypothesis.
Yet not all findings have supported the minority threat hypothesis (see Hawkins & Hardy, 1989; Yates, 1997) . Inconsistent findings can result when researchers fail to include measures, control for multicollinearity, and/or test for nonlinear relationships or interactions. For example, racial prejudice of Whites toward Blacks (Taylor, 1998) and the relationships between minority presence and spending on law enforcement seem to be nonlinear (Jackson, 1989) . It has also been found that African American population has a curvilinear effect on imprisonment disparities between Blacks and Whites. That is, although an increase in the Black population is associated with increased policing and punishment severity, once the Black population becomes large enough to influence politicians through voting and political pressure, the Black population is then related to decreases in policing and punishment severity (Keen & Jacobs, 2009 ). Similar findings have been found in U.S. politics, whereby minority threat has a curvilinear relationship with support for liberal legislation (Jacobs & Tope, 2007) .
Although the majority of minority threat research has focused on Black populations (i.e., ''racial threat''), recent work has also studied Hispanic populations (i.e., ''ethnic threat''). Results indicate that large Hispanic populations result in similar outcomes as large Black populations, including an increased fear of victimization (Chiricos, McEntire, & Gertz, 2001; Eitle & Taylor, 2008) , growing support for using ethnicity in punishment decisions (Johnson, Stewart, Pickett, & Gertz, 2011) , and applying punitive punishments in educational settings (Payne & Welch, 2010) . Scholars also have linked minority threat to increased police activity, including police brutality (Holmes, 2000) but this relationship tends to be nonlinear, particularly in regard to ethnic threat (Kane, 2003) . Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) also find that size of Hispanic population is positively related to imprisonment rates; however, they conclude that minority (Black) ''has a more substantial influence on U.S. imprisonment rates'' than ethnic (Hispanic) threat (p. 81). To take into account minority threat arguments, we posit that an increase in the minority (Black and Hispanic) populations will result in greater collateral sanctions. Furthermore, we acknowledge the potential for a curvilinear relationship between minority threat and felony barriers in line with the threat hypothesis.
Finally, we take into account other structural features that are often associated with crime and punishment as control measures in our study. For example, regional measures that denote southern and western states were included, due to the evidence of regional variations in punishment and historic overt racism in the South in the form of slavery and Jim Crow laws. Furthermore, other studies have found criminal justice outcomes differed significantly between southern and nonsouthern states (Greenberg, Kessler, & Loftin, 1985; Jackson, 1986) , which requires controls for region. We also control for crime rates and other structural features of the areas, such as age structure and percentage of males. We now turn to a discussion of our data and methods.
Data and Methods

Data
The adoption of collateral sanctions at the state level are far from unusual, and the list of collateral sanctions and including how they vary from state to state is too expansive to include in this article. Attempts have been made by others (e.g., the American Bar Association's ''National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction'' 1 ) to catalog collateral sanctions at the state level, and queries for collateral sanction-legal statutes within individual states alone result in the thousands. The Legal Action Center (LAC) provides detailed information on each state's collateral sanctions for the years 2004 and 2008 from their ''Roadblocks to Reentry'' project, allowing for state-level comparisons of collateral sanctions that serve as Roadblocks to Reentry relating to seven categories: employment, driver's licenses, criminal records, voting, public benefits, public housing, and adoptive (PHA)/foster parenting rights. The LAC is a U.S.-based nonprofit public interest law firm with offices in New York and Washington, D.C. that was established in 1973 by the Vera Institute of Justice and has worked for the past three decades on issues of discrimination. 2 In addition to cataloging how many types of laws each state adopts, the LAC grades each state's collateral sanctions in terms of the extent to which specific laws and policies create roadblocks to reentry. The grading categories range from 1 (least) to 10 (worst) level of legal barriers or roadblocks, which hinders felony reentry, posed by the state. Following up on their landmark 2004 study of legal barriers imposed on people with felony convictions, the LAC offers an updated and comprehensive analysis of state laws and policies that serve as legal barriers to reentry in the seven areas listed previously for the year of 2008. The 2008 LAC Roadblocks to Reentry data are used in this study and have been used by other scholars in published works.
3 Details on how the LAC collects, evaluates, and accesses collateral sanctions are available on the LAC's website (http://lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/) and discussed subsequently.
State grades for employment, driver's licenses, criminal records, voting, public benefits, PHA/foster parenting rights were determined by LAC in the following manner: For employment, 5 points were given to states that allow employers and occupational licensing agencies to ask about arrests that did not result in conviction, and up to 5 points were given if blanket bans against hiring ex-felons are legal. 4 Five points were subtracted from state employment scores if occupational bars can be circumvented via rehabilitation or other set process. For driving privileges, 5 points were given if states suspend/revoke driving privileges following alcohol-or other-drug-related felonies even if the crime did not involve a motor vehicle or effected one's driving ability, and 5 points were given if driving privileges could be suspended/revoked for 6 months or more. One point was subtracted if restricted driver's licenses are available so offenders can drive to and from preapproved activities such as work and/or school.
Turning to the access to criminal records grade, 3 points were given if records for arrests that never results in conviction cannot be sealed, and 3 points were given if minor or old conviction records cannot be sealed; however, 1 point was given instead for each if the records could be sealed but ex-felons admit to the records if asked by an employer. Additionally, 2 points were given if only currently incarcerated person's conviction records are available online, 3 if the information for persons on probation or parole are also available, and 4 if all conviction records are available online. For voting, 10 points were assigned if all persons convicted of a crime are disenfranchised; 9 if disenfranchisement only applies to felons; 6 if states allow ex-felons to restore otherwise permanently banned rights via a predetermined restoration process; 5 if states only disenfranchise those incarcerated, on parole, or on probation; 4 if only those who are incarcerated or on parole are denied voting rights; 3 if only currently incarcerated persons are disenfranchised; and 0 if the state does not disenfranchise anyone due to conviction record.
For public assistance 5 points were given for each program (TANF and SNAP) states fully implement the federal ban against ex-felons with drug-related convictions receiving benefits; however, points for each program were cut in half if the ban could be circumvented by the ex-felon participating in drug treatment or completing all parts of his or her punishment. Four points per program were given if ''less effective modifications'' were a part of the state's laws, and no points were given to states who opted out of both the TANF and SNAP ban. For public housing 5 points were given to states that take arrests not resulting into conviction into consideration when determining if persons will receive housing assistance and an additional 5 points were given if the PHA did not have policies in place mandating each applicant's criminal histories relevance to housing be taken into consideration on a case-by-case basis. Finally, for the parenting grade, 5 points were given to states that ban all felons from adopting, and an additional 5 were given to states that ban all felons from acting as foster parents.
By using the previously mentioned detailed 2008 data, LAC summarized the scores across each category to generate an overall or total barriers toward felony convictions score for each state. This state-level measure is the outcome variable in our models, which varied from a minimum score of 6.5 to a high of 46.0, with an average of 28.47. Table 1 provides a list of the worst and best states in regard to what extent its specific laws and policies create roadblocks to reentry. As shown here, the higher total roadblocks score indicates more collateral sanctions adopted by the state. Those states included Alaska, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia. On the other hand, states that had the lowest roadblock scores included Illinois, New York, California, and Hawaii.
Total barriers to reentry scores do not represent a count of the number of barriers or sanctions but instead represent a calculated severity score that can be used to compare states (i.e., a score of 10 does not imply that there are 10 sanctions in place when compared to a state with a score of 7. It does, however, indicate that a state with a score of 10 has greater barriers to reentry as a result of number of types of sanctions, duration of sanctions, and potential exemptions). Severity score such 5 (2010, 2013) , where data from the ''General Social Survey, American National Election Studies, and the iPOLL data bank provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research'' regarding ''attitudes towards the police and criminal justice system, treatment of criminals, the death penalty, and gun ownership'' were analyzed using multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) to generate state-level estimates of punitiveness of the public's support for tough on crime policies. The full list of survey questions used in the state-level punitiveness measure has been provided in Appendix B, and can be found at Enns' webpage (http:// thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Enns). This measure, as well as the MRP method for generating a state-level public opinion measure, has been validated (Enns, 2010) . Conservativism and punitiveness have a moderate correlation of .418, indicating that these two measures capture distinctly different public attitudes. Our final measure is an indicator of religiosity, which is the percentage of people from each state who stated in the Pew Research Center's 2008 U.S. Religious Landscape Survey that their religion is very important to them. As mentioned previously, this measure has been commonly used.
We assess minority threat by type of minority presence. That is, we include the percentage of Blacks in a state and the natural log of the percentage of Hispanics to take into account both types of minority presences. The natural log form of percentage Hispanic is used to correct for the skewed distribution in this measure. To determine if a curvilinear relationship exists between collateral consequences and either Black population size or Hispanic population size, percentage Black, and percentage Hispanic were both squared and also included in this study. The squared measures of each is believed to be associated with lower collateral sanctions due to the inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship between minority populations and punishment found in prior literature (Keen & Jacobs, 2009) .
To isolate the relationship of minority threat on collateral sanctions separate from the actual threat of crime, control measures for crime rates in each state were also included. Using 2010 Uniform Crime Report data, we calculate two crime measures-violent arrests 6 rate and drug arrests rate 7 -because state-level collateral sanctions tend to focus on violence and drug related offenses. Finally, we include other control measures to capture regional variations (dummy codes for whether a state is located in the South or Western part of the United States), age structure (percentage persons 18-24 years of age) and the percentage male in the population. The bivariate correlation matrix for all variables included in our analysis is provided (Appendix C). Given the high correlation between some independent variables, sensitivity analysis was performed to detect multicollinearity among the regressors in the multivariate models. That is, a careful examination is required because multicollinearity can cause significant problems of statistical inference, contributing to instability and inefficiency in our multivariate regression coefficients (see Land, McCall, & Cohen, 1990) . While there is no clear-cut criterion for evaluating multicollinearity in regression models (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980) , in addition to an examination of the correlation matrix provided, we performed two additional statistical test (1) estimated variance inflation factors (VIFs) and (2) a series of nested models where each predictor is added into the model one at a time as further tests for multicollinearity. First, one of the most common tests utilized in macro-level studies is the estimation of VIFs. Specifically, VIFs measure how much the variances of the estimated regression coefficients are inflated, where values of 10.0 or higher may be indicative of multicollinearity (Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Neter, 2004 ) but a more conservative cut off of 4.0 or higher is traditionally used in empirical studies. The range for the VIF scores are provided in Table 2 . Here we see that VIFs slightly exceed the traditional cut off of 4.0, yet they do not approach values of 10.0 or higher as indicated by Kutner et al. as evidence of multicollinearity.
Second, evidence of multicollinearity among the regressors may be found if changes in the algebraic signs and/or significance levels of the estimated regression coefficients occur when a theoretically relevant variable is added or deleted from the model. For this statistical test, we add each theoretically relevant regressor into the model one-at-a-time to determine if instability in the sign or magnitude of the effect size occurs. While the full set of models are not shown, there were no significant changes in algebraic signs and significance levels for each regressor as measures were added. The results shown in Table 2 provide partial evidence of this claim. That is, there is evidence of stability in both significance levels and algebraic signs as additional theoretically relevant predictors are added into the models (see Model 1 through Model 3). Based on this careful examination of multicollinearity in this study, our results appear stable and robust. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for all our measures included in the analysis. The average number of collateral sanctions was 28.47 with a standard deviation of 9.54. Religiosity, the first of two public ideology indicators, had a mean of 55.63, indicating that on average, approximately 55% of the state population claimed religion was very important to them. For the public ideology of conservativeness, the average score of 47.05 suggests that approximately 47% of the state's population voted for the republican candidate (John McCain) in the 2008 presidential election. The state-level punitiveness mean was 51.12, indicating that slightly over half of the states express preferences for punitiveness measures against crime and toward justice issues.
Turning to the minority threat indicators, the Black population averages 11% across the states. And while the Hispanic population averaged 10.5% in 2010, as indicated previously, we used and report the log form of the Hispanic population to adjust for skewness in this measure. Violent arrest rates were on average 134.18 with a standard deviation of 69.12, and drug arrest rates were 408.85 with a standard deviation of 147.83.
Analytical Procedure
We considered a couple of different estimation procedures based on preliminary analysis and the distributional information of our outcome variable. First, the outcome variable is the total barriers to reentry or sanctions scores constructed by the LAC which are zero truncated, meaning the values could not be a true zero, but rather they range in value from 6.5 to 46. Second, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates would be possible but not advisable since calculated rates based on the state population size would lead to extremely small values and require additional transformation before they could be used in our regression analysis. In these cases, Poissonbased model using the actual counts as the outcome is more reliable than an OLS regression estimations (see, e.g., by Osgood, 2000; Osgood & Chambers, 2000) . Given that the distribution of the outcome variable is positive integers without the possibility of a zero value, the zero-truncated Poisson (ZTP) procedure is the most appropriate estimation procedure, where collateral sanctions were used as the outcome variable and the logged state population size variable was included as an exposure variable in the model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009 ). The ZTP function truncates the distribution with the truncation restricted to as k > 0, deriving a probability function g(k;l) from a standard Poisson distribution f(k;l) as follows:
Results
The results of the ZTP regression estimates are displayed in Table 2 . Model 1 includes the control variables and the public ideology measures of conservatism, public opinion toward punitiveness and religiosity only. In Model 2, we add the minority threat indicators of percentage African American and percentage Hispanic to the equation. The final model contains the full set of regressors, with the addition of percentage Black squared and percentage Hispanic squared. While count/Poisson models do not provide an R 2 estimation, we used the ''fitstat'' command in Stata to offer a pseudo R 2 estimate in our models, along with an overall goodness-of-fit model indicator with the log likelihood value. Because we are interested in the impact of both public ideology and minority threat arguments on state-level adoption of collateral sanctions against felony offenders, while controlling for various other structural features of the U.S. states, we focus largely on the final model (Model 3) for our results. Our interpretation of these results will be organized around key theoretical constructs-public ideologies and minority threat-and includes an interpretation when multiplying the coefficient by a value of exp (bx k ) to easily explain the results (see Osgood, 2000) .
Public Ideologies
As shown in Model 3, conservatism, state punitiveness, and religiosity have a statistically significant influence on state-level collateral sanctions, when controlling for other theoretically relevant predictors and the structural features of U.S. states. First, a positive relationship is found between voting for a Republican presidential candidate and collateral sanctions score, wherein a standard deviation increase in conservative voters is associated with approximately a 12% increase in the states adoption of barriers against felony offenders (exp [.010 Â 11.02] ¼ 1.117). On the other hand, state punitiveness has a statistically significant, inverse relationship with collateral sanctions. That is, a standard deviation increase in the state's punitive attitudes leads to a 11% decline in collateral sanctions ([À.037 Â 3.14]À1) ¼ .1097. While the finding concerning conservative voting supports our first hypothesis, the punitive measure does not. Turning to religiosity, we find religiosity is unrelated to the increase in legal barriers applied at the state level. This finding is unexpected, given prior research examining the role religion plays in the application of social control at the state level (Curry, 1996; Grasmick et al., 1992; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004) . Furthermore, among the control measures, the regional controls and percentage males are statistically significant predictors of collateral sanction scores. That is, states located in the southern region and have higher percentages of males have higher collateral sanction scores, but Western states decreased collateral sanctions. The drug arrest rate was unrelated to collateral sanctions, but the rate of violent crime arrests increased the state's collateral sanction score once public ideologies and potential for minority threat at the macro level were controlled for in the model.
Minority Threat
In order to look at the direct impact of minority threat on collateral sanctions at the state level, the percentage of the population being Black and percentage Hispanic were included in Model 3. As shown, neither the size of the Black population nor Hispanic population 8 leads to collateral sanctions severity. This finding is contrary to our predictions where the larger minority populations (both African American and those individuals of Hispanic origins) would affect collateral sanctions significantly.
Because previous literature has also found evidence of a curvilinear relationship between race and punishment severity (Keen & Jacobs, 2009) , the percentage Black and percentage Hispanic indicators were both squared and included in Model 3. Their inclusion resulted in statistically significant relationships for one of the four minority threat measures included in our study. As expected, as the growth in the Black population reaches a sizable proportion, a positive relationship is found with collateral sanctions. Specifically, as the Black population reaches larger proportion of the state's residential population, the barriers placed upon convicted felony increases by approximately 57% (exp [.001 Â 453.29] ¼ 1.5735). However, a considerable growth in the Hispanic population is not associated with an increase in collateral sanction severity. This finding is consistent with some research that finds racial threat more related to crime control strategies, over ethnic threat. A discussion of these findings and some conclusions about the role public ideologies and minority threat play in the collateral consequences convicted felony face in states throughout the United States are provided in the next section.
Discussion and Conclusion
Public ideologies, such as political conservatism and religiousness, and minority threat in the form of racial and ethnic threat have been tied to greater social control and criminal sanction severity; however, previous literature has not investigated the relationship between these factors and collateral sanctions. To fill this gap in the previous literature, this study examined whether social control and punishment in the form of collateral sanctions are also related to political and religious climate and minority threat. Collateral sanctions that prevent ex-felons from obtaining a driver's license, employment in certain fields, public assistance, and so on and those that hinder full reintegration back into society (e.g., felony disenfranchisement and easily accessible criminal records-even for those who were never convicted) are enacted and enforced at the state level.
Using the LAC's Roadblocks to Reentry state-level data on collateral sanctions score and statelevel predictors of conservatism, punitiveness, religiosity, and minority threat, our research reveals that state-level political ideology and minority threat are significantly related to collateral sanctions against convicted felons. As expected, conservatism is positively related to state-level collateral sanctions rates. Holding all else constant, states with larger conservative populations, as measured by votes for Republican candidates who typically support tougher penalties for crime, have higher collateral sanction rates. Although this finding supports the previous literature and previously mentioned hypothesis that conservatism is positively related to punishments, punitiveness's negative relationship to collateral sanctions is contrary to expectation. As mentioned earlier, the conservativeness and punitiveness measures are clearly measuring two distinct aspects of public ideology. The relationship between conservatism and collateral sanctions cannot simply be chalked up to Republican's successful use of tough on crime rhetoric to win favor among conservative constituents, resulting in conservative states enacting more collateral sanctions, particularly considering that states with greater punitiveness as measured by public support for tough on crime policies had lower collateral sanctions.
It is possible that politicians elected to office, particularly those who run successfully on a tough on crime platform, may overestimate the punitiveness of their constituents (Gottschalk 2008) , particularly since election results do not include input from disenfranchised people. Since racial minorities and the poor are more likely to become convicted felons and are more likely to vote for Democratic candidates (Uggen & Manza, 2002) , higher rates of Republican voters may be positively related to collateral sanction severity because of felon disenfranchisement, which has been found to sway elections in favor of the Republican Party Uggen, Manza, & Thompson, 2006) . It is also possible that collateral sanctions, although conceived in this article as forms of punishment, are dissimilar to other forms of punishment and control. Collateral sanctions may not be legislated intentionally as punishments, although they serve as such, and instead may be linked to conservative views of deservingness of full citizenship and/or public assistance or other reasons than punitiveness and conservative punitive leanings. Future research should include measures of both conservativsm and punitiveness to better understand the relationship between them and punishment. Punitiveness may explain some forms of punishment, such as incarceration rates (Enns, 2010 (Enns, , 2013 but not others such as collateral sanctions. Additionally, inclusion of lagged variables in change models to account for the time it may take for public opinion and election results to impact public policy may improve future research.
Contrary to our expectations and previous works on religiosity and control/punishment (Curry, 1996; Grasmick et al., 1992; Grasmick & McGill, 1994) , religiosity was not found to be significantly related to collateral sanction severity. It is worth mentioning that religion and spirituality are quite complex and diverse. For instance, previous studies have linked fundamentalist identity and found particular denominations to support for formal social control (Curry, 1996; Grasmick et al., 1992; Grasmick & McGill, 1994) . Future research on public ideology and collateral sanctions may benefit from a more precise measurement of fundamentalist Protestantism, such as measures used by Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) , building on Quinn, Anderson, Bradley, Goetting, and Shriver (1982), Morgan and Watson (1991) , and Greenberg and West (1998 as cited in Jacobs and Carmichael [2001] ). However, those measures of religion were unavailable at the state level for the current analysis. Additionally, forgiveness also plays an important role in many religions; although religion has been associated with punishment severity in previous studies (Curry, 1996; Grasmick et al., 1992; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001 , it is possible that religion is not significantly related to collateral sanctions because postincarceration application of such sanctions, possible for life, may conflict with the forgiveness messages in religious doctrines. Measures that capture the percentage of state populations who view God as either a compassionate or a forgiving God, as well as a dispassionate and powerful figure could more precisely address the nature of the relationship between religiosity and collateral sanctions (see, Unnever, Cullen, & Applegate, 2005) .
Contrary to expectations, our findings indicate that greater presence of Black citizens in a state leads to greater collateral sanctions in states with substantial African American residents once the percentage-Black measure was squared and included in Model 3. The results indicate that minority threat has the opposite relationship with collateral sanctions than expected. Public ideology measures explain variation in collateral sanction severity better than any of the minority threat measures. Although the current findings include a significant relationship between minority threat and collateral sanctions, supporting the basic tenants of minority threat hypotheses, effects were weak after controlling for public ideology and state-level demographics and the relationship was not curvilinear as expected. Theoretically, the relationship between punishment and racial threat is curvilinear; however, the current findings indicate this not to be the case with regard to collateral sanctions. Instead of reversing the direction of the relationship between racial composition and collateral sanctions, collateral sanction severity scores in states with large Black populations increase as Black populations grow in relation to the overall population. Theoretically, large minority populations have the ability to swing policy back in the opposite direction once the minority population is sizable; however, felon disenfranchisement of minorities may account for large Black populations' inability to reverse the severity of collateral sanctions in their state. In states like Florida with considerably high felon disenfranchisement rates of minorities, sizable minority populations are denied the opportunity of influencing public policy through voting. Significant findings regarding Hispanic individuals were not found, hence supporting racial threat's influence on states adopting higher levels of collateral sanctions against felons but not supporting ethnic threat; however, static measures of minority populations may not accurately measure minority threat. Changes in minority population sizes over time may measure threat better (Caravelis, Chiricos, & Bales, 2011; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; King & Wheelock, 2007; Wang & Mears, 2010) . Additionally, segregation and economic threat-which were not accounted for in the models-could affect perceived threat and, in turn, punishment severity via collateral sanctions.
Although drug arrest rates were not associated with collateral sanctions, violent crime arrests were significantly related to harsher collateral sanctions. This is particularly interesting considering that many collateral sanctions are specifically directed at drug offenders-Public assistance bans for convicted criminals often apply to drug offenders but not violent criminals. Put simply, although violent crime is significantly related to harsher punishments of previously convicted persons, the punishments that have been put in place seem misdirected at drug offenders instead of violent offenders. This could be due to misperceptions among the public and politicians regarding the relationship between drug use and violent and property crime.
While our studies provide support for the role public ideologies and racial threat play in the application of legal barriers to convicted felons, we did not examine how minority threat and public ideologies relate to particular types of sanctions. For instance, it is possible that minority populations are more strongly related to felony disenfranchisement than to criminal records' access. Similarly, although drug arrest rates were not found to be significantly related to state-level collateral sanctions levels, they may be related to sanctions relating to public housing and assistance, which are often applied only to drug felons (Federal Interagency Reentry Council, 2011) . To tease these possible relationships out, future analyses should look at the relationship between public ideologies, racial threat and the different types of collateral sanctions often applied to convicted felons in state and federal laws. In addition to teasing out the relationship between minority threat and the general types of collateral sanction categories as outlined by the LAC's data, attention should be given to the role criminal asset forfeiture, also a possible collateral sanction of conviction although not an automatic one, plays in punishment.
Although it is clear that public ideologies, and to a lesser degree minority threat, are significantly related to state-level collateral sanction levels, additional research is necessary to determine what the effects of collateral sanctions are. Minorities are disproportionately impacted negatively by the criminal justice system in the form of being suspected, arrested, convicted, incarcerated, and executed at higher rates (Free, 2001; Petersilia, 1985; Reiman, 2007; Wordes, Bynum, & Corley, 1994) . According to Wheelock (2005) , Blacks are more likely to be negatively affected by collateral sanctions than Whites due to their overrepresentation in the criminal justice system and increased rates of disadvantage. This is particularly true for Black males. This unequal disadvantage may be exacerbated by increased collateral sanction severity in states with larger minority populations.
Collateral sanctions, such as disenfranchisement and restricting ex-felons from public assistance, driving, working in particular fields, adoption, and so on, prevent full reintegration of ex-felons back into society, possibly resulting in greater recidivism as a result of diminished social bonds and collective efficacy or greater strain. ''Stigmatizing shaming'' such as collateral sanctions may increase criminality due to secondary deviance; however, ''reintegrative'' shaming which would involve no or nonpermanent collateral sanctions would aid in reintegrating ex-felons into society and reduce recidivism (Braithwaite, 1989 (Braithwaite, , 2002 . In turn, future research should investigate the relationship between stigmatizing collateral sanction types and levels and state-level recidivism rates. States with large minority and conservative populations are more likely to have higher stigmatizing collateral sanction rates and therefore may have higher rates of recidivism as a result.
Appendix A
Examples of Legislated Felony Collateral Sanctions
Employment. Many ex-offenders face hiring discrimination due to their felony status. Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prevents employers from barring all individuals with a criminal record from employment, state law can allow employers to deny an individual employment if he or she has a prior conviction that is related to the job (i.e., cashier and theft), particularly if the crime was recent (Federal Interagency Reentry Council) . Additionally, persons with previous felony convictions are frequently barred from working within particular settings (e.g., Persons with sex offense convictions on their record are frequently barred from working anywhere children frequent) and/or career fields (e.g., Persons with drug convictions on their record may be barred from working in the medical field).
Civic participation. Ex-felons are also frequently denied access to civic participation in the form of voting and serving on juries. Although there is no federal law disenfranchising ex-offenders with a felony conviction from voting, all states, except for Maine and Vermont, suspend voting rights for incarcerated individuals. Sixteen states 9 (including Maine and Vermont) allow all nonincarcerated felons to vote upon release from incarceration. Most states require ex-felons to complete all postincarceration obligations (i.e., supervision, pay off fines, and restitution, etc.) before voting rights are restored. In some states, ex-felons must wait a set period of time after completing their formal punishment and/or receive clemency or a pardon before voting is allowed, and 4 states (Alabama, Maryland, Ohio, and Tennessee) allow for permanent disenfranchisement (Federal Interagency Reentry Council; American Civil Liberties Union).
Family. In many states, status as an ex-felon is often used to bar individuals from adopting or acting as a foster parent (LAC, 2009b) . Although 38 states take the type of felony, its relation to the person's ability to effectively parent, and time since conviction into consideration when determining if an ex-felon can adopt or foster a child, 13 states do not and bar all ex-felons from adopting and fostering children (LAC, 2009a) .
Public assistance. Individuals with drug-or sex-related felony convictions face additional collateral sanctions. They can be denied public assistance in the form of cash assistance, food stamps, public housing, and educational assistance.
10 Federal welfare law bans individuals with drug-related felonies on their records from receiving TANF or SNAP; however, states are allowed to ''opt out'' or modify the legislation at the state level (Federal Interagency Reentry Council There is much discussion about the best way to deal with the problem of urban unrest and rioting. Some say it is more important to use all available force to maintain law and order-no matter what the results. Others say it is more important to correct the problems of poverty and unemployment that gives rise to the disturbances. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (7-point scale) 27. More Prisons (Gallup): [Which of the following approaches] To lower[ing] the crime rate in the United States, some people think additional money and effort should go to attacking social and economic problems that lead to crime through better education and job training. Others feel more money and effort should go to deterring crime by improving law enforcement with more prisons, police, and judges. Which comes closer to your view? 28. Do Not Protect Rights (ANES): Some people are primarily concerned with doing everything possible to protect the legal rights of those accused of committing crimes. Others feel that it is more important to stop criminal activity even at the risk of reducing the rights of the accused.
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought about this much? (7-point scale) 29. Register Shotguns (NGPS): Do you favor or oppose the mandatory registration of rifles and shotguns? 
